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ABSTRACT
With the development of cloud computing, more and more sensitive data are uploaded to cloud by companies or individuals,
which brings forth new challenges for outsourced data security and privacy. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE) provides fine-grained access control of encrypted data in the cloud; in a CP-ABE scheme, an access structure,
also referred to as ciphertext-policy, is sent along with a ciphertext explicitly, and anyone who obtains a ciphertext can
know the access structure associated with the ciphertext. In certain applications, access structures contain very sensitive
information and must be protected from everyone except the users whose private key attributes satisfy the access structures.
In this paper, we propose a new model for CP-ABE with partially hidden access structure (See Figure 2). In our model,
each attribute consists of two parts: an attribute name and its value; if the private key attributes of a user do not satisfy the
access structure associated with a ciphertext, the specific attribute values of the access structure are hidden, while other
information about the access structure is public. Based on the CP-ABE scheme proposed by Lewko and Waters [1] recently,
we then present a concrete construction of CP-ABE with partially hidden access structure and prove that it is fully secure
in the standard model. In addition, we discuss how our new model can be employed to construct a privacy-preserving
electronic medical record system in the cloud environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage services enable users to upload and store
their data remotely in the cloud environment because of the
great potential of providing various services to the society
at significantly reduced cost. Many distributed applications
require complex access control mechanisms where a user
is able to access sensitive data in the cloud only if the
user possesses a certain set of credentials or attributes.
A healthcare information system is required to restrict
access of medical records to eligible doctors or researchers.
A customer relation management system may allow access
of customer data by marketing and sales executives of a
company only. In these systems, access control of data is
either required by legislation (e.g., Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act) or company regulations.
Traditionally, access controls are enforced by employing
trusted servers to store the data and mediate access con-
trol. However, services are increasingly storing data across
many servers shared with other data owners. Because soft-
ware systems are not guaranteed to be bug-free, and the
hardware platforms are not under the direct control of the
data owners in such distributed systems, security risks are
abundant, which may allow access of sensitive informa-
tion by unauthorized users, other applications, and other
data owners. To mitigate users’ concern about their data,
a common solution is to store sensitive data in encrypted
form so that it will remain private even if a data server
is not trusted or compromised. The encrypted data, how-
ever, must be amenable to sharing and access control. Sahai
Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 4897
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and Waters [2] addressed this problem by introducing the
notion of attribute-based encryption (ABE). ABE enables
public key based one-to-many encryption and is envisioned
as a promising cryptographic primitive for realizing scal-
able and fine-grained access control to encrypted data.
There are two kinds of ABE schemes [3], key-policy ABE
(KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) schemes.
In this paper, our concern is on the latter.
In a CP-ABE scheme [4], every ciphertext is associated
with an access structure or access formula on attributes,
and every user’s secret key is associated with a set of
attributes. A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext only if
the set of attributes associated with the user’s private key
satisfies the access structure associated with the cipher-
text. CP-ABE is similar to the traditional access control
model where data is protected with access structures, and
users with credentials satisfying the structures are allowed
access to the data. However, in contrast to the traditional
access control model where data is stored in cleartext and
access control is enforced by trusted servers, CP-ABE
stores encrypted data on untrusted servers, and access con-
trol is performed via matching of a user’s privacy key
attributes to access structure of a ciphertext. In the stan-
dard CP-ABE schemes [4–7], a cleartext access structure is
attached to a ciphertext; therefore, anyone who obtains the
ciphertext is able to know its corresponding access struc-
ture. Unfortunately, cleartext access structures may leak
extremely sensitive information about the encrypted data
in certain applications (such as electronic medical record
(EMR) systems), as we will demonstrate in Section 2.
To hide access structures in CP-ABE, one can construct
CP-ABE with hidden access structure from an attribute-
hiding inner-product predicate encryption (IPE) scheme
[8]. Predicate Encryption (PE) was proposed by Katz,
Sahai and Waters [8] as a generalized fine-grained notion
of encryption that covers CP-ABE. In a PE scheme, secret
keys that correspond to predicates and ciphertexts are
associated with sets of attributes; a secret key SKf cor-
responding to a predicate f can be used to decrypt a
ciphertext associated with an attribute set I if and only if
f (I) = 1. Katz, Sahai, and Waters [8] also introduced the
idea of attribute-hiding, a security notion for PE that is
stronger than the basic security requirement of payload-
hiding. Roughly speaking, attribute-hiding requires that a
ciphertext conceal the associated attributes as well as the
plaintext, while payload-hiding only requires that a cipher-
text conceal the plaintext. The special case of inner-product
predicates is obtained by having each attribute correspond
to a vector Ex, and each predicate fEv corresponds to a vectorEv, where fEv(Ex) = 1 if Ex  Ev = 0. (Ex  Ev denotes the standard
inner-product.)
As mentioned in [6], in order to use inner-product
predicates for CP-ABE, access structures must be written
in conjunctive normal form or disjunctive normal form,
which can cause a superpolynomial blowup in size for arbi-
trary access structures. Because it is extremely inefficient
to implement CP-ABE schemes with fully hidden access
structure derived from attribute-hiding IPE, we investigate
how to trade-off fully hidden access structure for the
efficiency of CP-ABE.
1.1. Our Contributions
In many applications, specific attribute values carry much
more sensitive information than the generic attribute names
(see Section 2 for a detailed discussion). This observation
motivates us to consider a new model of CP-ABE with par-
tially hidden access structure. In this model, each attribute
consists of two parts: an attribute name and its value; if the
set of attributes associated with a user’s private key does
not satisfy the access structure associated with a cipher-
text, attribute values in the access structure are hidden from
the user, while other information, such as attribute names,
about the access structure is public.
In the preliminary version of this paper [9], based on
the CP-ABE scheme proposed by Lewko et al. [6], we
present a concrete construction of CP-ABE with partially
hidden access structure, which is proven fully secure in the
standard model using the dual system encryption method-
ology in [10]. However, similar to the scheme in [6], our
scheme in [9] has the restriction that each attribute can
only be used once in an access formula, which is called
one-use CP-ABE. This can be extended to a system which
allows reuse of attributes by setting a fixed bound N on the
maximum number of times an attribute may be used and
having separate parameters for each use. This expands the
size of the public parameters as well as the size of secret
keys by a factor of N and hence incurs a considerable loss
in efficiency.
Recently, Lewko and Waters [1] developed a new
methodology for utilizing the prior techniques to prove
selective security for functional encryption systems as a
direct ingredient in devising proofs of full security. Based
on their work, we propose a new construction of CP-ABE
with partially hidden access structure, which eliminates the
aforementioned efficiency loss and allows unrestricted use
of attributes while still achieving full security in the stan-
dard model. Note that in a CP-ABE scheme, if the access
structure associated with a ciphertext is fully hidden, a user
is not able to know which attribute set satisfies the access
structure, and this makes decryption difficult. In the pro-
posed CP-ABE with partially hidden access structure, we
avoid the problem by adding some redundant components
to a ciphertext, so that if the private key attributes of a
user indeed satisfy the access structure associated with the
ciphertext, the user knows which attribute set to use in
decrypting the ciphertext. Our scheme handles any access
structure that can be expressed as a Linear Secret-Sharing
Scheme (LSSS), and its ciphertext size scales linearly with
the complexity of the access structure.
1.2. Related Work
In this section, we summarize the major related work
in the areas of ABE, KP-ABE, PE, CP-ABE, CP-ABE
with partially hidden access structure, and dual system
encryption.
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Attribute-Based Encryption. The notion of ABE was first
introduced by Sahai and Waters as an application of their
fuzzy identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme [2], where
both ciphertexts and secret keys are associated with sets of
attributes. The decryption of a ciphertext is enabled if and
only if the attribute set for the ciphertext and the attribute
set for the secret key overlap by at least a fixed threshold
value d.
KP-ABE. Goyal et al. [3] formulated two complimen-
tary forms of ABE: KP-ABE and CP-ABE. In a CP-
ABE scheme, decryption keys are associated with sets
of attributes, and ciphertexts are associated with access
structures. In a KP-ABE scheme, the situation is reversed:
decryption keys are associated with access structures while
ciphertexts are associated with sets of attributes. There
exists a general method to transform KP-ABE to CP-
ABE [11]. In terms of the expressive power of access
structures, Goyal et al. [3] presented the first KP-ABE
supporting monotonic access structures. To enable more
flexible access control structures, Ostrovsky et al. [12] pre-
sented a KP-ABE system that supports the expression of
non-monotone formulas in key policies. The problem of
building KP-ABE systems with multiple authorities was
investigated in [13–15]. Recently, Lewko and Waters [16]
proposed a KP-ABE scheme which is ‘unbounded’ in the
sense that the public parameters do not impose additional
limitations on the functionality of the scheme.
Predicate Encryption. We briefly discuss the work on
PE because CP-ABE can be derived from inner-product
PE. The notion of PE was introduced by Katz et al. [8].
They also proposed the first inner-product PE. Shi and
Waters [17] presented a delegation mechanism for a class
of PE, in which the admissible predicates of the system
are more limited than inner-product predicates. Okamota
and Takashima [18] presented a (hierarchical) delegation
mechanism for an inner-product PE scheme. Shen et al.
[19] introduced a new security notion of PE called predi-
cate privacy and proposed a symmetric-key inner-product
PE, which achieves both plaintext privacy and predi-
cate privacy. These schemes were only proven selectively
secure. Lewko et al. [6] proposed the first fully secure
inner-product PE. Okamota and Takashima [20] presented
a fully secure PE for a wide class of admissible predicates,
which are specified by non-monotone access structures
combined with inner-product predicates.
Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption. The first
CP-ABE construction was proposed by Bethencourt et
al. [4] and was proven secure under the generic group
model. Later, Cheung and Newport [5] proposed a CP-
ABE scheme that is secure under the standard model;
however, access structures in this scheme are restricted to
AND of different attributes. Recently, secure and expres-
sive CP-ABE schemes [6,7] were proposed. CP-ABE
schemes with multiple authorities were also studied
in [21,22].
Ciphertext-policy Attribute-based Encryption with Par-
tially Hidden Access Structure. Nishide et al. [23] con-
sidered CP-ABE schemes which hide encryptor-specified
access structures associated with ciphertexts. The admis-
sible access structures in [23] can be expressed as AND
gates on multi-valued attributes with wildcards, and the
CP-ABE scheme in [23] can be considered as a special
case of CP-ABE with partially hidden access structure.
Li et al. [24] followed their work and studied the prob-
lem of user accountability. All these schemes are proven
to be selectively secure only, which is a weak security
model analogous to the selective-ID model [25,26] in IBE
schemes. Recently, Lai et al. [27] proposed a fully secure
(cf. selectively secure) CP-ABE scheme with partially hid-
den access structure; however, their scheme only supports
restricted access structures as in [23,24]. Moving one step
forward, we proposed a fully secure CP-ABE scheme
with partially hidden access structure expressed as LSSS,
which is more flexible and expressive than previous works
[23,24,27].
Dual System Encryption. The dual system encryption
methodology, introduced by Waters in [10], will be used
in the security proofs of our construction. This method-
ology has been leveraged to obtain constructions of fully
secure (H)IBE from simple assumptions [10], fully secure
(H)IBE with short ciphertexts [28], fully secure (H)IBE
and ABE with leakage resilience [29], fully secure ABE,
and inner-product PE [6,20].
1.3. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we show how CP-ABE with partially hidden access struc-
ture can be used to construct a privacy-preserving EMR
system. In Section 3, we review some standard notations
and cryptographic definitions. In Section 4, we describe the
security model for CP-ABE with partially hidden access
structure and propose a concrete construction. We state our
conclusion in Section 5.
2. PRIVACY-PRESERVING
ELECTRONIC MEDICAL
RECORD SYSTEM
An EMR is a collection of patients’ health related infor-
mation to allow efficient, consistent, and universal sharing
of health information. Because of the sensitivity of health
related information, providing secure storage and flexi-
ble access to EMR is the main challenge in today’s EMR
systems. In health care, it must meet the requirements
of Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) for any use or disclosure of protected healthcare
information. On the other hand, with the emergence of
cloud computing, it is attractive for EMR service providers
to shift their EMR applications and storage into the cloud,
in order to enjoy the elastic resources and reduce the
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:4897–4913 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 4899
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operational cost. However, a cloud environment introduces
an even greater risk to security and privacy of sensitive
data. Data stored in cloud may reside on computers that are
located in dispersed geographic locations and can be seen
by many in transit and in their stored form.
Recently, the use of attribute-based cryptography to
provide secure cloud storage for EMRs was considered in
[30–33]. To enable fine-grained and scalable access con-
trol to encrypted data, the solutions in [30–33] leveraged
the standard CP-ABE schemes to encrypt data. However,
the standard CP-ABE schemes do not hide access struc-
tures associated with the ciphertexts, and this property is
not appropriate for protecting confidential data because
the cloud service provider may infer sensitive information
from the access structures about the encrypted data as well
as about the users who are granted access to the data. For
example, the nature of a patient’s health problem is pretty
clear if a cardiologist or a psychiatrist has access to his
or her record. The treating medical staff may also have an
interest in hiding the access control structures, for exam-
ple, to avoid being approached by the press when treating
public figures.
Figure 1 depicts the system architecture of a cloud-
based privacy-preserving EMR system. Suppose that a
healthcare provider intends to submit an EMR to the cloud
and specifies that it can only be accessed by a cardiologist
in University Hospital or by the patient with social security
number 123-45-6789. The healthcare provider encrypts the
EMR using a CP-ABE scheme in order to keep it confiden-
tial from the cloud service provider and other unauthorized
parties. If the healthcare provider uses a standard CP-
ABE scheme for encryption, everyone including the cloud
service provider is able to know the access structure asso-
ciated with the encrypted EMR, and can infer that someone
with social security number 123-45-6789 suffers from a
heart problem. This is clearly not acceptable and shows the
necessity of hiding the access structures from prying eyes
in a privacy-preserving EMR system.
We observe that, in the access structure shown in
Figure 1, ‘Cardiologist’ and ‘123-45-6789’ leak more
sensitive information than ‘Occupation’ and ‘SS#’, respec-
tively. In other words, specific attribute values carry
much more sensitive information than the generic attribute
names. This observation motivates the notion and design
of CP-ABE with partially hidden access structure, and we
believe that this new notion is more appropriate to use in
designing privacy-preserving EMR systems than the stan-
dard CP-ABE schemes used in [30–33]. In the aforemen-
tioned example, if the healthcare provider uses a CP-ABE
scheme with partially hidden access structure to encrypt
EMRs, anyone obtaining the ciphertexts only knows the
following information about the access structure:
SS# : * OR (Affiliation : * AND Occupation : *),
Figure 1. Architecture of a cloud-based privacy-preserving electronic medical record (EMR) system.
Figure 2. (a) An access structure and (b) the corresponding partially hidden access structure.
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while the sensitive attribute values, ‘123-45-6789’, ‘Uni-
versity Hospital’, and ‘Cardiologist’, are hidden from the
public. Figure 2 shows graphically this example of partially
hidden access structure. We will formally introduce the
notion of CP-ABE with partially hidden access structure in
Section 4.
3. NOTATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
If S is a set, then s $ S denotes the operation of picking
an element s uniformly at random from S. If A is a finite
set, |A| denotes the cardinality of the set A. Let N denote
the set of natural numbers. If  2 N then 1 denotes the
string of  ones. Let z  A(x, y, : : :) denote the operation
of running an algorithm A with inputs (x, y, : : :) and output
z. A function f () is negligible, if for every c > 0 there
exists a c such that f () < 1/c for all  > c.
3.1. Access structures
Definition 1 (Access structure [34]). Let {P1, : : :, Pn} be
a set of parties. A collection A  2{P1,:::,Pn} is monotone
if 8B, C : if B 2 A and B  C, then C 2 A. An access
structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a col-
lection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty
subsets of {P1, : : : , Pn}, i.e.,A  2{P1,:::,Pn}\{;}. The sets
in A are called authorized sets, and the sets not in A are
called unauthorized sets.
In our context, attributes play the role of parties, and we
restrict our attention to monotone access structures. It is
possible to (inefficiently) realize general access structures
using our techniques by treating the negation of an attribute
as a separate attribute.
3.2. Linear secret-sharing schemes
Our construction will employ LSSS. We use the definition
adapted from [34]:
Definition 2 (Linear secret-sharing schemes). A secret
sharing scheme … over a set of parties P is called linear
(over Zp) if
(1) The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
(2) There exists a matrix A with ` rows and n columns
called the share-generating matrix for …. For all
i = 1, : : : , `, the ith row of A is labeled by a party
(i) ( is a function from {1, : : : , `} to P). When
we consider the column vector v = (s, r2, : : : , rn),
where s 2 Zp is the secret to be shared, and
r2, : : : , rn 2 Zp are randomly chosen, then Av is
the vector of ` shares of the secret s according to ….
The share (Av)i belongs to party (i).
It is shown in [34] that every LSSS according to the
aforementioned definition also enjoys the linear recon-
struction property, defined as follows. Suppose that … is
an LSSS for the access structure A. Let S 2 A be any
authorized set, and let I  {1, : : : , `} be defined as I =
{i|(i) 2 S}. Then, there exists constants {!i 2 Zp}i2I
such that, if {i} are valid shares of any secret s according
to …, then
P
i2I !ii = s. Let Ai denotes the ith row of A,
we have
P
i2I !iAi = (1, 0, : : : , 0). These constants {!i}
can be found in time polynomial in the size of the share-
generation matrix A [34]. Note that, for unauthorized sets,
no such constants {!i} exist.
Boolean Formulas Access structures might also be
described in terms of monotonic boolean formulas. Using
standard techniques [34] one can convert any monotonic
boolean formula into an LSSS representation. We can rep-
resent the boolean formula as an access tree. An access tree
of ` nodes will result in an LSSS matrix of ` rows. We refer
the reader to the appendix of [22] for a discussion on how
to perform this conversion.
3.3. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based
encryption
A CP-ABE scheme consists of the following four algo-
rithms:
Setup(1, U) takes as input a security parameter  and
the attribute universe description U. It outputs the public
parameters PK and a master secret key MSK.
KeyGen(PK,MSK,S) takes as input the public parame-
ters PK, the master secret key MSK, and a set of attributes
S. It outputs a secret key SKS .
Encrypt(PK, M,A) takes as input the public parameters
PK, a message M, and an access structure A. It outputs a
ciphertext C.
Decrypt(PK,SKS , C) takes as input the public parame-
ters PK, a secret key SKS and a ciphertext C. It outputs a
message M.
Let (PK,MSK)  Setup(1, U), SKS  
KeyGen(PK, MSK,S), and C  Encrypt(PK, M,A).
For correctness, we require the following to hold:
(1) If the set S of attributes satisfies the access structure
A, then M  Decrypt(PK,SKS , C);
(2) Otherwise, with overwhelming probability,
Decrypt (PK,SKS , C) outputs a random message.
3.4. Composite order bilinear groups
We will construct our scheme in composite order bilinear
groups whose order is the product of four distinct primes.
Composite order bilinear groups were first introduced
in [35].
Let G be an algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter 1 and outputs a tuple (p1, p2, p3, p4,G,GT , e),
where p1, p2, p3,and p4 are distinct primes, G and GT are
cyclic groups of order N = p1p2p3p4, and e : GG ! GT
is a map such that
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:4897–4913 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 4901
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(1) (Bilinear) 8g, h 2 G, a, b 2 ZN , e(ga, hb) =
e(g, h)ab;
(2) (Non-degenerate) 9g 2 G such that e(g, g) has order
N in GT .
We further require that multiplication inG andGT , as well
as the bilinear map e, are computable in time polynomial
in . We use Gp1 ,Gp2 ,Gp3 , and Gp4 to denote the sub-
groups of G having order p1, p2, p3, and p4, respectively.
Observe that G = Gp1 Gp2 Gp3 Gp4 . Note also that
if g1 2 Gp1 and g2 2 Gp2 then e(g1, g2) = 1. A simi-
lar rule holds whenever e is applied to elements in distinct
subgroups.
We now state the complexity assumptions we use.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are some instantiations of the general
subgroup decision assumption defined in [36]. Assump-
tions 3 and 4 are the three part Diffie–Hellman assumption
and the source group q-parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Exponent (BDHE) assumption used in [1], respectively,
and we use them in the group whose order is a product of
four primes. Assumptions 5 and 6 are essentially the same
as Assumption 1 in [1].
Assumption 1. Let G be as mentioned previously. We
define the following distribution:
(p1, p2, p3, p4,G,GT , e) G(1), N = p1p2p3p4
g
$ Gp1 , X3
$ Gp3 , X4
$ Gp4
D = (G,GT , N, e, g, X3, X4)
T1
$ Gp1 Gp2 , T2
$ Gp1
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption
1 is defined as
Adv1A =
ˇˇ
Pr
A(D, T1) = 1] – Pr[A(D, T2) = 1ˇˇ .
Definition 3. We say G satisfies Assumption 1 if for any
polynomial time algorithm A, Adv1A is negligible.
Assumption 2. Let G be as mentioned previously. We
define the following distribution:
(p1, p2, p3, p4,G,GT , e) G(1), N = p1p2p3p4
g, X1
$ Gp1 , X2, Y2
$ Gp2
X3, Y3
$ Gp3 , X4
$ Gp4
D = (G,GT , N, e, g, X1X2, Y2Y3, X3, X4)
T1
$ Gp1 Gp2 Gp3 , T2
$ Gp1 Gp3
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption
2 is defined as
Adv2A = |Pr[A(D, T1) = 1] – Pr[A(D, T2) = 1]|.
Definition 4. We say G satisfies Assumption 2 if for any
polynomial time algorithm A, Adv2A is negligible.
Assumption 3. Let G be as mentioned previously. We
define the following distribution:
(p1, p2, p3, p4,G,GT , e) G(1), N = p1p2p3p4
g
$ Gp1 , g2
$ Gp2 , X3
$ Gp3 , X4
$ Gp4
x, y, z
$ ZN ,
D = (G,GT , N, e, g, g2, gx2, g
y
2, g
z
2, X3, X4)
T1 = g
xyz
2 , T2
$ Gp2
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption
3 is defined as
Adv3A = |Pr[A(D, T1) = 1] – Pr[A(D, T2) = 1]|.
Definition 5. We say G satisfies Assumption 3 if for any
polynomial time algorithm A, Adv3A is negligible.
Assumption 4. Let G be as mentioned previously. We
define the following distribution:
(p1, p2, p3, p4,G,GT , e) G(1), N = p1p2p3p4
g
$ Gp1 , g2
$ Gp2 , X3
$ Gp3 , X4
$ Gp4
x, y, f , z1, : : : , zq $ ZN
D = (G,GT , N, e, g, X3, X4
g2, g
f
2, g
xf
2 , g
yi
2 8i 2 [2q] \ {q + 1}
gy
i/zj
2 8i 2 [2q] \ {q + 1}, j 2 [q]
gxfzj2 8j 2 [q]
g
xfyizj0 /zj
2 8i 2 [q], j, j0 2 [q] s.t. j ¤ j0)
T1 = g
xyz
2 , T2
$ Gp2
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption
4 is defined as
Adv4A = |Pr[A(D, T1) = 1] – Pr[A(D, T2) = 1]|.
Definition 6. We say G satisfies Assumption 4 if for any
polynomial time algorithm A, Adv4A is negligible.
Assumption 5. Let G be as mentioned previously. We
define the following distribution:
(p1, p2, p3, p4,G,GT , e) G(1), N = p1p2p3p4
˛, s
$ ZN , g $ Gp1
g2, X2, Y2
$ Gp2 , X3
$ Gp3 , X4
$ Gp4
D = (G,GT , N, e, g, g2, g˛X2, gsY2, X3, X4)
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T1 = e(g, g)˛s, T2
$ GT
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption
5 is defined as
Adv5A = |Pr[A(D, T1) = 1] – Pr[A(D, T2) = 1]|.
Definition 7. We say G satisfies Assumption 5 if for any
polynomial time algorithm A, Adv5A is negligible.
Assumption 6. Let G be as mentioned previously. We
define the following distribution:
(p1, p2, p3, p4,G,GT , e) G(1), N = p1p2p3p4
a, s
$ ZN , g $ Gp1 , g2, X2, Y2, D2
$ Gp2
X3
$ Gp3 , X4, Z0, Y4, D4
$ Gp4
D = (G,GT , N, e, g, g2, gaX2, gaZ0, gsY2Y4, X3, X4)
T1 = gasD2D4, T2
$ Gp1 Gp2 Gp4
The advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption
6 is defined as
Adv6A = |Pr[A(D, T1) = 1] – Pr[A(D, T2) = 1]|.
Definition 8. We say G satisfies Assumption 6 if for any
polynomial time algorithm A, Adv6A is negligible.
4. CIPHERTEXT-POLICY
ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION
WITH PARTIALLY HIDDEN ACCESS
STRUCTURE
In this section, we first describe the security model for CP-
ABE with partially hidden access structure. Then, based
on the CP-ABE scheme given by Lewko and Waters [1],
we propose a new CP-ABE scheme, which satisfies the
security definition of CP-ABE with partially hidden access
structure.
Our construction supports arbitrary monotone access
formulas or structures. In the following, we will use the
terms access formula and access structure interchangeably.
As in [1], we express access structures by an LSSS matrix
A over the attributes in the system but with a significant
difference. In our construction, each attribute includes two
parts: attribute name and its value. Without loss of general-
ity, we assume that there are n categories of attributes and
every user has n attributes with each attribute belonging to
a different category. For notational purposes, let i denote
the attribute name of the ith category attribute. A user’s
attribute set S is parsed as (s1, : : : , sn), where si 2 ZN is
the value of attribute i. We express an access structure by
(A, ,T ), where A is `  m share-generating matrix,  is
a map from each row of A to an attribute name (i.e.,  is
a function from {1, : : : , `} to {1, : : : , n}), T can be parsed
as (t(1), : : : , t(`)), and t(i) is the value of attribute (i)
specified by the access formula.
Using our notations, a user’s attribute set S = (s1, : : :,
sn) satisfies an access formula (A, ,T ) if and only if there
exists I  {1, : : : , `} and constants {!i}i2I such thatX
i2I
!iAi = (1, 0, : : : , 0) and s(i) = t(i) for 8i 2 I
where Ai denotes the ith row of A. We also say that I 
{1, : : : , `} satisfies (A, ) if there exist constants {!i}i2I
such that
P
i2I !iAi = (1, 0, : : : , 0). We define IA, as the
set of minimum subsets of {1, : : : , `} that satisfies (A, ).
By ‘minimum’, we mean the subset cannot become smaller
while still satisfying (A, ).
Note that, in our construction to be presented in the
next sections, the specific attribute values (i.e., T ) of an
access structure (A, ,T ) is hidden, while other informa-
tion about the access structure (i.e., (A, ) is sent along
with the ciphertext explicitly).
4.1. Security model of ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption with partially
hidden access structure
We now give the security model of CP-ABE with par-
tially hidden access structure, described as a security game
between a challenger and an adversary A. The game
proceeds as follows:
Setup The challenger runs Setup(1, U) to obtain the
public parameters PK and a master secret key MSK. It
gives the public parameters PK to the adversary A and
keeps MSK to itself.
Query phase 1 The adversary A adaptively queries
the challenger for secret keys corresponding to sets of
attributes S1, : : : ,Sq. In response, the challenger runs
SKSi  KeyGen(PK,MSK,Si) and gives the secret key
SKSi to A, for 1  i  q.
Challenge The adversary A submits two (equal length)
messages M0 and M1, and two access structures (A, ,T0)
and (A, ,T1), subject to the restriction that (A, ,T0) and
(A, ,T1) cannot be satisfied by any of the queried attribute
sets. The challenger selects a random bit ˇ 2 {0, 1},
sets C = Encrypt(PK, Mˇ , (A, ,Tˇ )) and sends C to the
adversary as its challenge ciphertext. Note that, the LSSS
matrix A and  are the same in the two access struc-
tures provided by the adversary. In a CP-ABE scheme with
partially hidden access structure, one can distinguish the
ciphertexts if the associated access structures have differ-
ent (A, ), because (A, ) is sent along with the ciphertext
explicitly.
Query phase 2 The adversary continues to adaptively
query the challenger for secret keys corresponding to sets
of attributes with the added restriction that none of them
satisfies (A, ,T0) and (A, ,T1).
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:4897–4913 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 4903
DOI: 10.1002/sec
L. Liu et al.
Guess The adversary A outputs its guess ˇ0 2 {0, 1} for ˇ
and wins the game if ˇ = ˇ0. The advantage of the adver-
sary in this game is defined as |Pr[ˇ = ˇ0] – 12 | where
the probability is taken over the random bits used by the
challenger and the adversary.
Definition 9. An access structure in a ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption scheme is partially hidden if
all polynomial time adversaries have at most a negligible
advantage in this security game.
4.2. Our Proposed Construction
The proposed CP-ABE scheme with partially hidden
access structure consists of the following algorithms:
Setup(1, U) The setup algorithm first runs G(1) to
obtain (p1, p2, p3, p4,G,GT , e) with G = Gp1  Gp2 
Gp3  Gp4 , where G and GT are cyclic groups of order
N = p1p2p3p4. Let the attribute universe description U =
ZN . Next, it chooses g, u, h1, : : : , hn 2 Gp1 , X3 2 Gp3 ,
X4, Z, Z0, Z00, Z0, Z1, : : : , Zn 2 Gp4 and ˛, a, b 2 ZN uni-
formly at random. The public parameters are published
as PK = (N, gZ, gaZ0, gbZ00, e(g, g)˛ , V = uZ0, {Hi =
hi  Zi}1in, X4). The master secret key is MSK =
(g, u, h1, : : : , hn, X3, a, b, ˛).
KeyGen(PK,MSK,S = (s1, : : : , sn)) The key generation
algorithm chooses t, Nt 2 ZN , and R, R0, R00, R1, : : : , Rn 2
Gp3 uniformly at random. The secret key SKS = (S, K,
K0, K00, {Ki}1in) is computed as
K = g˛gatgbNtR, K0 = gNtR0
K00 = gtR00, Ki = (usi hi)tRi
Encrypt(PK, M 2 GT , (A, ,T )) Let A be an `m matrix,
 a map from each row Aj of A to an attribute name,
and T = (t(1), : : : , t(`)) 2 Z`N . The encryption algo-
rithm chooses two random vectors v and v02 ZmN , denoted
v = (s, v2, : : : , vm) and v0 = (s0, v02, : : : , v0m). It also chooses
rj, r0j 2 ZN and QZ01, QZ001 , QZ02, QZ002 , QZ1,j, QZ01,j, QZ2,j, QZ02,j 2 Gp4
uniformly at random, for 1  j  `. The ciphertext is
C = ((A, ), QC1, C01, C001 , {C1,j, D1,j}1j`, QC2, C02, C002 ,{C2,j, D2,j}1j`), where
QC1 = M  e(g, g)˛s, C01 = (gbZ00)s  QZ01 = gbsZ01
C001 = (gZ)s  QZ001 = gsZ001
C1,j = (gaZ0)Ajv(Vt(j) H(j))–rj  QZ1,j
= gaAjv(Vt(j) H(j))–rj Z1,j
D1,j = (gZ)rj  QZ01,j = grj Z01,j
QC2 = e(g, g)˛s
0
, C02 = (gbZ00)s
0  QZ02 = gbs
0
Z02
C002 = (gZ)s
0  QZ002 = gs
0
Z002
Cr2, j = (gaZ0)Ajv0 (Vt(j) H(j))–r
0
j  QZ2,j
= gaAjv0 (Vt(j) H(j))–r
0
j Z2,j
D2,j = (gZ)r
0
j  QZ02,j = gr
0
j Z02,j
Z01 = Z00
s QZ01, Z001 = Zs QZ001 , Z1,j = (Z0)Ajv QZ1,j, Z01,j = Zrj QZ01,j,
Z02 = Z00
s0 QZ02, Z002 = Zs
0 QZ002 , Z2,j = (Z0)Ajv
0 QZ2,j and Z02,j =
Zr
0
j QZ02,j
Decrypt(PK,SKS , C) Let C = ((A, ), QC1, C01, C001 , {C1,j,
D1,j}1j`, QC2, C02, C002 , {C2,j, D2,j}1j`), SKS =
(S, K, K0, K00, {Ki}1in) and S = (s1, : : : , sn). The
decryption algorithm first calculates IA, from (A, ),
where IA, denotes the set of minimum subsets of
{1, : : : , `} that satisfies (A, ). It then checks if there exists
an I 2 IA, that satisfies
QC2 = e(C002 , K)e(C02, K0)–1
.
0
@Y
i2I
(e(C2,i, K00)  e(D2,i, K(i)))!i
1
A
where
P
i2I !iAi = (1, 0, : : : , 0). If no element in IA,
satisfies the aforementioned equation, it outputs ?. Other-
wise, it computes
e(C001 , K)e(C01, K0)–1
.
0
@Y
i2I
(e(C1,i, K00)  e(D1,i, K(i)))!i
1
A
= e(g, g)˛se(g, g)ats
.0@Y
i2I
e(g, g)atAiv!i
1
A
= e(g, g)˛s
Then ,M can be recovered as QC1/e(g, g)˛s.
In our construction, a ciphertext includes two parts:
( QC1, C01, C001 , {C1,j, D1,j}1j`) and ( QC2, C02, C002 , {C2,j,
D2,j}1j`). The first part is an encryption of the mes-
sage M. The second part is redundant and can be viewed as
an encryption of the identity element 1. If the private key
attributes of a user satisfy the access structure associated
with the ciphertext, the redundant second part will help
the user decide which his attribute set satisfies the access
structure; and if yes, the user then can use his private key
to decrypt the first part of the ciphertext and recover the
plaintext M.
Efficiency. The size of the public parameters, a user’s pri-
vate key and a ciphertext are (n + 5)|G| + |GT |, (n + 3)|G|,
and (4`+4)|G|+2|GT |, respectively, where |G| and |GT | are
the lengths of the bit-representation of a group element in
G and GT respectively. For an access structure (A, ,T ),
let 1 = |IA, |, IA, = {I1, : : : , I1 }, 2 = |I1| +    + |I1 |
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and 3 = max{|I1|, : : : , |I1 |}. The computational costs of
an encryption under (PK, M, (A, ,T )), and a decryption
are (4` + 4)tG_m_e + 2tGT _e and  (21 + 22 + 23 +
2)tp+(1+1)tGT _m_e, respectively, where tp, tGT _e, tG_m_e
and tGT _m_e are the computational costs of bilinear map,
exponentiation in GT , multi exponentiation in G or GT ,
respectively.
Security. The CP-ABE construction in [1] uses composite
order bilinear groups whose order is the product of three
distinct primes, while our construction uses groups whose
order is the product of four distinct primes. Note that in our
construction, the public parameters (except for e(g, g)˛)
and the ciphertext (except for QC1 = Me(g, g)˛s and QC2 =
e(g, g)˛s0 ) have an element from Gp4 as a factor. This for-
mation allows us to prove that an access structures in our
CP-ABE scheme is partially hidden. At the same time how-
ever, the formation does not affect decryption operations,
because none of the components in a private key has ele-
ment inGp4 as a factor. We now state the security theorem
of our CP-ABE scheme.
Theorem 1. If Assumptions 1–6 hold, then the access
structure in the proposed CP-ABE is partially hidden.
Proof. Following the approach by Lewko and Waters
[28], we define two additional data structures: semi-
functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys. These will
not be used in the real system, but will be used in our
proof. Semi-functional Ciphertext Let g2 denote a gener-
ator of the subgroup Gp2 . A semi-functional ciphertext is
created as follows. We first use the encryption algorithm
to form a normal ciphertext C0 = ((A, ), QC1, C01, C001 ,
{C1,j, D1,j}1j`, QC2, C02, C002 , {C2,j, D2,j}1j`). Then,
we choose random exponents a0, b0, c, c0 2 ZN and two
random vectors w and w02 ZmN . We also choose random
values i 2 ZN associated with attributes, and random
values j,  0j 2 ZN associated with row j of the `  m
matrix A. The semi-functional ciphertext C is set as

(A, ), QC1, C01  gb
0c
2 , C
00
1  gc2
C1,j  ga
0Ajw+j(j)
2 , D1,j  g
–j
2

1j`
QC2, C02  gb
0c0
2 , C
00
2  gc
0
2 ,(
C2,j  g
a0Ajw0+ 0j (j)
2 , D2,j  g
– 0j
2

1j`
!
Observe that the structure of the elements in Gp2 here is
similar to the structure inGp1 but is unrelated to the public
parameters. It should be noted that these values a0, b0, and
i are chosen randomly once and then fixed. These same
values will also be involved in semi-functional keys which
we will be defined in the next discussions.
Semi-functional Key A semi-functional key will take on
one of three forms. To create a semi-functional key, we
first use the key generation algorithm to form a normal
key SK0S = (S, K, K0, K00, {Ki}1in). Then, we choose
d, d0 2 ZN , and W 2 Gp2 uniformly at random. The
semi-functional key of type 1 is set as

S, K  ga0d+b0d02 , K0  gd
0
2 , K
00  gd2,
n
Ki  gdi2
o
1in

The semi-functional key of type 2 is set as

S, K W, K0  gd02 , K00  gd2,
n
Ki  gdi2
o
1in

The semi-functional key of type 3 is set as
	S, K W, K0, K00, {Ki}1in

We will prove the security of our scheme from Assump-
tions 1–6 using a hybrid argument over a sequence of
games. The first game, Gamereal, is the real security game
(the ciphertext and all the keys are normal). In the next
game, Game0, all of the keys will be normal, but the chal-
lenge ciphertext will be semi-functional. We let Q denote
the number of key queries made by the attacker. For k from
1 to Q, we define
Gamek,1 In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semi-
functional, the first k –1 keys are semi-functional of type 3,
the kth key is semi-functional of type 1, and the remaining
keys are normal.
Gamek,2 In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semi-
functional, the first k –1 keys are semi-functional of type 3,
the kth key is semi-functional of type 2, and the remaining
keys are normal.
Gamek,3 In this game, the challenge ciphertext is semi-
functional, the first k keys are semi-functional of type 3,
and the remaining keys are normal.
For notational purposes, we think of Game0,3 as
another way of denoting Game0. We note that in
GameQ,3, all of the keys are semi-functional of type 3.
In the penultimate game, GameFinal0 , all the keys are
semi-functional, and the ciphertext is a semi-functional
encryption of a random message, independent of the mes-
sages M0 and M1 provided by the adversary. The final
game, GameFinal1 , is the same as GameFinal0 , except
that in the challenge ciphertext, C1,x and C2,x are chosen
from Gp1  Gp2  Gp4 at random (thus, the ciphertext
is independent of T0 and T1 provided by the adversary).
It is clear that in the final game, no adversary can have
advantage greater than 0.
We prove that these games are indistinguishable in the
following seven lemmas. Therefore, we conclude that the
advantage of the adversary in Gamereal (i.e., the real
security game) is negligible. This completes the proof of
Theorem 1.
It should be noted that the indistinguishability between
Gamek,1 and Gamek,2 will require different computa-
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:4897–4913 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 4905
DOI: 10.1002/sec
L. Liu et al.
tional assumptions for Phase 1 and Phase 2 key queries.
We let Q1 denote the number of Phase 1 queries, and we
will address this indistinguishability separately for k  Q1
and k > Q1. Our handling of Phase 1 queries will closely
resemble the selective security proof strategy for KP-ABE
in [3], while our handling of Phase 2 queries will closely
resemble the selective security proof strategy for CP-ABE
in [7].
Lemma 1. Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 1. Then,
Gamereal and Game0 are computationally indistinguish-
able.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distin-
guishes Gamereal and Game0. Then, we can build an
algorithm B with non-negligible advantage in breaking
Assumption 1. B is given g, X3, X4, T and will simulate
Gamereal or Game0 with A. B chooses ˛, a, b, a0, a1,
: : :, an 2 ZN and Z, Z0, Z00, Z0, Z1, : : : , Zn 2 Gp4 uni-
formly at random. It then sets u = ga0 , h1 = ga1 , : : : , hn =
gan , and sends A the public parameters
PK = (N, gZ, gaZ0, gbZ00, e(g, g)˛ , V = uZ0
{Hi = hi  Zi}, X4)
It can generate normal keys in response to A’s key requests
by using the key generation algorithm, because it knows
the MSK = (g, u, h1, : : : , hn, X3, a, b, ˛).
At some point, A sends B two (equal length) messages
M0, M1, and two access structures (A, ,T0), (A, ,T1),
where A is an `m matrix. B chooses ˇ 2 {0, 1} randomly
and does the following:
(1) B chooses random values Qv2, : : : , Qvm, Qv02, : : : , Qv0m 2
ZN and creates vectors Qv = (1, Qv2, : : : , Qvm) and Qv0 =	
1, Qv02, : : : , Qv0m


.
(2) B chooses random values Qrj, Qr0j 2 ZN and Z01, Z001 ,
Z02, Z001 , QZ1,j, Z01,j, QZ2,j, Z02,j 2 Gp4 for 1  j  `.
(3) Let Tˇ = (t(1), : : : , t(`)). B chooses random
exponent Qs 2 ZN and computes
QC1 = Mˇ  e(g˛ , T), C01 = Tb  Z01
C001 = T  Z001
C1,j = TaAjQv  T–(a0t(j)+a(j))Qrj  QZ1,j
D1,j = TQrj  Z01,j
QC2 = e(g˛ , TQs), C02 = TbQs  Z02
C002 = TQs  Z002
C2,j = TQsaAjQv
0  T–(a0t(j)+a(j))Qr0j  QZ2,j
D2,j = T
Qr0j  Z02,j
(4) B sets the challenge ciphertext as C = ((A, ),
QC1, C01, C001 , {C1,j, D1,j}1j`, QC2, C02, C002 , {C2,j,
D2,j}1j`) and sends it to A.
If T $ Gp1 Gp2 , let T = gsgc2, then
QC1 = Mˇ e(g, g)˛s, C01 = gbsZ01  gbc2
C001 = gsZ001  gc2
C1,j = gaAjv(Vt(j) H(j))–rj Z1,j  gaAjw+j(j)2
D1,j = grj Z01,j  g
–j
2
QC2 = e(g, g)˛s
0
, C02 = gbs
0
Z02  gbc
0
2
C002 = gs
0
Z002  gc
0
2
C2,j = gaAjv
0 (Vt(j) H(j))–r
0
j Z2,j  g
aAjw0+ 0j (j)
2
D2,j = g
r0j Z02,j  g
– 0j
2
where s0 = sQs, c0 = cQs, v = (s, sQv2, : : : , sQvn),
v0 = (s0, s0 Qv02, : : : , s0 Qv0n), rj = sQrj, r0j = sQr0j , Z1,j =
QZ1,j(Zt(j)0 Z(j))rj , Z2,j = QZ2,j(Z
t(j)
0 Z(j))
r0j
, w = cQv, w0 =
cQsQv0, j = –cQrj,  0j = –cQr0j , and (j) = a0t(j) + a(j). This is
a semi-functional ciphertext and B simulates Game0. We
note that the values of a, b, a0, a(j), t(j), Qs, Qv2, : : : , Qvm, Qv02,
: : :, Qv0m, Qrj, Qr0j modulo p1 are uncorrelated from their val-
ues modulo p2, so this is properly distributed. If T
$ Gp1 ,
it is easy to observe that this is a normal ciphertext and B
simulates Gamereal. Hence, B can use the output of A to
distinguish between these possibilities for T .
Lemma 2. Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 2. Then,
Gamek–1,3 and Gamek,1 are computationally indistin-
guishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distin-
guishes Gamek–1,3 and Gamek,1. Then, we can build
an algorithm B with non-negligible advantage in break-
ing Assumption 2. B is given g, X1X2, Y2Y3, X3, X4, T and
will simulate Gamek–1,3 or Gamek,1 with A. B chooses
˛, a, b, a0, a1, : : : , an 2 ZN and Z, Z0, Z00, Z0, Z1, : : : , Zn 2
Gp4 uniformly at random. It then sets u = ga0 , h1 =
ga1 , : : : , hn = gan and sends A the public parameters:
PK = (N, gZ, gaZ0, gbZ00, e(g, g)˛ , V = uZ0
{Hi = hi  Zi}1in, X4)
Note that B knows the master secret key MSK = (g, u, h1,
: : :, hn, X3, a, b, ˛) associated with PK. Let us now explain
how B answers the j-th key query for S = (s1, : : : , sn).
For j < k, B creates a semi-functional key of type 3 by
choosing random exponents t, Nt, Qd 2 ZN , random elements
R0, R00, R1, : : : , Rn 2 Gp3 , and setting
K = g˛gatgbNt(Y2Y3)Qd , K0 = gNtR0, K00 = gtR00
{Ki = (usi hi)tRi}1in
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We note that this is a properly distributed semi-functional
key of type 3 because the value of Qd modulo p2 is uncorre-
lated to its value modulo p3.
For j > k, B creates a normal key by running the key
generation algorithm because it knows the MSK.
To answer the k-th key quest for S = (s1, : : : , sn),
B chooses random exponent Qt 2 ZN , random elementsQR, QR0, QR00, QR1, : : : , QRn 2 Gp3 and sets
K = g˛TaTbQt QR, K0 = TQt  QR0, K00 = T  QR00
{Ki = Ta0si+ai  QR0i}1in
We have the following observations. If T $ Gp1 Gp2 
Gp3 , then T can be written as gtgd2 NR, and
K = g˛gatgbNtR  gad+bd02 , K0 = gNtR0  gd
0
2
K00 = gtR00  gd2, {Ki = (usi hi)tRi  gdi2 }1in
where Nt = tQt, d0 = dQt, R = NRa+bQt QR, R0 = NRQt QR0, R00 =
NR QR00, Ri = NRa0si+ai QR0i, and i = a0si + ai. This is a
semi-function key of type 1. Note that the values of
Qt, a, b, a0, ai, si modulo p1 are uncorrelated from their val-
ues modulo p2. If T
$ Gp1  Gp3 , this is a properly
distributed normal key.
At some point, A sends B two (equal length) messages
M0, M1 and two access structures (A, ,T0), (A, ,T1),
where A is an `m matrix. B chooses ˇ 2 {0, 1} randomly
and does the following:
(1) B chooses random values Qv2, : : : , Qvm, Qv02, : : : , Qv0m 2
ZN and creates vectors Qv = (1, Qv2, : : : , Qvm) and Qv0 =
(1, Qv02, : : : , Qv0m).(2) B chooses random values Qrj, Qr0j 2 ZN and Z01, Z001 ,
Z02, Z002 , QZ1,j, Z01,j, QZ2,j, Z02,j 2 Gp4 for 1  j  `.
(3) Let Tˇ = (t(1), : : : , t(`)). B chooses random
exponent Qs 2 ZN and computes
QC1 = Mˇ  e(g˛ , X1X2)
C01 = (X1X2)b  Z01, C001 = X1X2  Z001
C1,j = (X1X2)aAjQv
(X1X2)–(a0t(j)+a(j))Qrj  QZ1,j
D1,j = (X1X2)Qrj  Z01,j
QC2 = e(g˛ , (X1X2)Qs)
C02 = (X1X2)bQs  Z02, C002 = (X1X2)Qs  Z002
C2,j = (X1X2)QsaAjQv
0
(X1X2)–(a0t(j)+a(j))Qr
0
j  QZ2,j
D2,j = (X1X2)Qr
0
j  Z02,j
(4) B sets the challenge ciphertext as C = ((A, ),
QC1, C01, C001 , {C1,j, D1,j}1j`, QC2, C02, C002 , {C2,j,
D2,j}1j`) and sends it to A.
If we let X1X2 = gsgc2, then
QC1 = Mˇ  e(g, g)˛s, C01 = gbsZ01  gbc2
C001 = gsZ001  gc2
C1,j = gaAjv(Vt(j) H(j))–rj Z1,j  gaAjw+j(j)2
D1,j = grj Z01,j  g
–j
2
QC2 = e(g, g)˛s
0
, C02 = gbs
0
Z02  gbc
0
2 , C
00
2 = g
s0Z002  gc
0
2
C2,j = gaAjv
0 (Vt(j) H(j))–r
0
j Z2,j  g
aAjw0+ 0j (j)
2
D2,j = g
r0j Z02,j  g
– 0j
2
where s0 = sQs, c0 = cQs, v = (s, sQv2, : : : , sQvm), v0 = (s0, s0
Qv02, : : : , s0 Qv0m), rj = sQrj, r0j = sQr0j , Z1,j = QZ1,j(Z
t(j)
0 Z(j))rj ,
Z2,j = QZ2,j(Zt(j)0 Z(j))
r0j
, w = cQv, w0 = cQsQv0, j = –cQrj,  0j =
–cQr0j , and (j) = a0t(j) + a(j). This is a semi-functional
ciphertext. Note that the values of a, b, a0, a(j), t(j), Qs,
Qv2, : : : , Qvm, Qv02, : : :, Qv0m, Qrj, Qr0j modulo p1 are uncorrelated
from their values modulo p2.
We can conclude that, if T $ Gp1 Gp2 Gp3 , then B
has properly simulated Gamek,1. If T
$ Gp1 Gp3 , then
B has properly simulated Gamek–1,3. Hence, B can use
the output of A to distinguish between these possibilities
for T .
Lemma 3. Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 3. Then,
Gamek,1 and Gamek,2 are computationally indistin-
guishable for a k from 1 to Q1 (recall these are all the
Phase 1 queries).
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distin-
guishes Gamek,1 and Gamek,2 for some k between 1
and Q1. Then, we can build an algorithm B with non-
negligible advantage in breaking Assumption 3. B is given
g, g2, gx2, g
y
2, g
z
2, X3, X4, T and will simulate Gamek,1 or
Gamek,2 with A. B chooses ˛, a, b, a0, a1, : : : , an 2 ZN ,
and Z, Z0, Z00, Z0, Z1, : : : , Zn 2 Gp4 uniformly at random.
It then sets u = ga0 , h1 = ga1 , : : : , hn = gan , and sends A
the public parameters
PK = (N, gZ, gaZ0, gbZ00, e(g, g)˛ , V = uZ0
{Hi = hi  Zi}1in, X4)
We note that B knows the master secret key MSK =
(g, u, h1, : : : , hn, X3, a, b, ˛) associated with PK and hence
can use the normal key generation algorithm to make
normal keys in response to A’s key requests from the
k + 1 request and onward. To respond to A’s first k – 1
key requests, B can create semi-functional keys of type 3
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because it knows the MSK and g2. Let us now explain how
B answers the k-th key query for S = (s1, : : : , sn).
Because we are assuming the k-th key query occurs in
Phase 1, S is declared before B must produce the challenge
ciphertext. This allows B to define the values i modulo
p2 to be shared by the k-th key and the semi-functional
challenge ciphertext after learning the set S. To set these
values, B chooses random exponents i 2 ZN for each
attribute belonging to S. For each attribute not belonging
to S, it implicitly sets i modulo p2 to be equal to x Qi
modulo p2, where random exponents Qi 2 ZN are chosen
uniformly at random. It also implicitly sets a0 equal to xy
modulo p2.
To form the k-th key, B first uses the normal key gener-
ation algorithm to produce a normal key K, K0, K00, Ki. It
then choose random exponents b0, d0 2 ZN and implicitly
sets d modulo p2 equal to z modulo p2. It sets the key as
Kgb
0d0
2 T , K
0gd02 , K00gz2, Ki(gz2)i
We observe that if T = gxyz2 , this will be a properly dis-
tributed semi-functional key of type 1, and when T is a
random element in Gp2 , this will be a properly distributed
semi-functional key of type 2.
A sends B two (equal length) messages M0, M1 and two
access structures (A, ,T0), (A, ,T1), where A is an ` 
m matrix. B chooses ˇ 2 {0, 1} randomly and does the
following:
(1) B first runs the normal encryption algorithm to
produce a normal ciphertext ( QC1, C01, C001 , {C1,j,
D1,j}1j`, QC2, C02, C002 , {C2,j, D2,j}1j`).(2) Let Tˇ = (t(1), : : : , t(`)). B computes a vector
Qw2 ZmN such that Qw  Aj = 0 modulo N for all j such
that t(j) = s(j), and the first entry of Qw is nonzero
modulo each prime dividing N. Note that, as shown
in [34], because the attribute set S cannot satisfy the
access structure of (A, ,Tˇ ), the vector Qw can be
efficiently found by B.
(3) B also chooses two random vectors w1 and
w22 ZmN . It will implicitly set the sharing vectors
w, w0 modulo p2 so that a0w = xy Qw + w1 and a0w0 =
xy Qw+w2. B also chooses random values j,  0j 2 ZN
for each j such that t(j) = s(j), and random values
Qj, Q 0j 2 ZN for each j such that t(j) ¤ s(j). For
these j’s such that t(j) ¤ s(j), it will implicitly set
j = –y Q–1(j)Aj  Qw + Qj and  0j = –y Q–1(j)Aj  Qw + Q 0j .
(4) It chooses random exponents c, c0 2 ZN and forms
the semi-functional challenge ciphertext as
QC1, C01  gb
0c
2 , C
00
1  gc2
C1,j  gAjw1+j(j)2 , D1,j  g
–j
28j s.t. t(j) = s(j)
C1,j  gAjw12 (gx2) Qj Q(j)
D1,j  (gy2)
Q–1(j)Aj Qwg– Qj2 8j s.t. t(j) = s(j)
QC2, C02  gb
0c0
2 , C
00
2  gc
0
2
C2,j  g
Ajw2+ 0j (j)
2 , D2,j  g
– 0j
28j s.t. t(j) = s(j)
C2,j  gAjw22 (gx2)
Q 0j Q(j)
D2,j  (gy2)
Q–1(j)Aj Qwg– Q
0
j
2 8j s.t. t(j) = s(j)
Observe that this is a properly formed semi-functional
ciphertext.
We can thus conclude that, if T = gxyz2 , then B has prop-
erly simulated Gamek,1. If T is a random element in Gp2 ,
then B has properly simulated Gamek,2. Hence, B can use
the output of A to distinguish between these possibilities
for T .
Lemma 4. Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 4. Then
Gamek,1 and Gamek,2 are computationally indistin-
guishable for a k > Q1 using an access matrix (A, ) of
size `  m where `, n  q.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distin-
guishes Gamek,1 and Gamek,2 for some k such that
Q1 < k  Q using an access matrix with dimensions
 q. Then, we can build an algorithm B with non-
negligible advantage in breaking Assumption 4. B is given
g, g2, g
f
2, g
xf
2 , g
yi
2 8i 2 [2q] \ {q + 1}, g
yi/zj
2 8i 2 [2q] \
{q + 1}, j 2 [q], gxfzj2 8j 2 [q], g
xfyizj0 /zj
2 8i 2 [q], j, j0 2
[q] such that j ¤ j0, X3, X4, T and will simulate Gamek,1
or Gamek,2 with A. B chooses ˛, a, b, a0, a1, : : : , an 2
ZN and Z, Z0, Z00, Z0, Z1, : : : , Zn 2 Gp4 uniformly at ran-
dom. It then sets u = ga0 , h1 = ga1 , : : : , hn = gan and sends
A the public parameters
PK = (N, gZ, gaZ0, gbZ00, e(g, g)˛ , V = uZ0
{Hi = hi  Zi}1in, X4)
We note that B knows the master secret key MSK =
(g, u, h1, : : : , hn, X3, a, b, ˛) associated with PK and hence
can use the normal key generation algorithm to make
normal keys in response to A’s key requests from the
k + 1 request and onward. To respond to A’s first k – 1
key requests, B can create semi-functional keys of type 3
because it knows the MSK and g2. Because we are assum-
ing the k-th key query occurs in Phase 2, A will request the
challenge ciphertext before requesting the k-th key.
A sends B two (equal length) messages M0, M1 and
two access structures (A, ,T0), (A, ,T1) for a challenge
ciphertext, where A is an `  m matrix. B first chooses
ˇ 2 {0, 1} randomly and runs the normal encryption
algorithm for (A, ,Tˇ ) to produce a normal cipher-
text ( QC1, C01, C001 , {C1,j, D1,j}1j`, QC2, C02, C002 ,{C2,j, D2,j}1j`). B chooses random values
Qb, Qj, Qj, Qj0 2 ZN . It will implicitly set a0 = xy modulo p2,
b0 = x + Qb modulo p2, j = xfzj + Qj, and  0j = xfzj + Q 0j for
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each j from 1 to `. Let Tˇ = (t(1), : : : , t(`)). For each
attribute i, we let Ji denote the set of indices j such that
t(j) = i. B define gi2 as
gi2 = g
Qi
2
Y
j2Ji

gy/zj2
Aj,1  gy2/zj2
Aj,2
  

gy
m/zj
2
Aj,m
It also chooses random values Qc, v1, : : : , vn, v01, : : : , v0n 2
ZN and implicitly sets c = f modulo p2, c0 = Qcf modulo p2,
w = (f + v1(a0)–1, fy + v2(a0)–1, : : :, fym–1 + vn(a0)–1), and
w0 = (f +v01(a0)–1, fy+v02(a0)–1, : : :, fym–1 +v0n(a0)–1). Then,B computes the semi-functional challenge ciphertext as 
(A, ), QC1, C01  gb
0c
2 , C
00
1  gc2

C1,j  ga
0Ajw+j(j)
2 , D1,j  g
–j
2

1j`
QC2, C02  gb
0c0
2 , C
00
2  gc
0
2 ,
C2,j  g
a0Ajw0+ 0j (j)
2 , D2,j  g
– 0j
2

1j`
!
Note that the semi-functional components (the parts in
Gp2 ) in the challenge ciphertext can be computed by B
using the Gp2 elements in the assumption.
Let us now explain how B answers the k-th key query
for S = (s1, : : : , sn). To form the k-th key, B first uses the
normal key generation algorithm to produce a normal key
K, K0, K00, Ki. Because the attribute set S cannot satisfy
the access structure of (A, ,Tˇ ), B can efficiently find a
vector  = (1, : : : , m)2 ZmN such that   Aj = 0 modulo
N for all j such that t(j) = s(j), and the first entry of  is
nonzero modulo each prime dividing N. B chooses random
exponent Qd 2 ZN and implicitly sets
d0 = –2yq – 3yq–1 – : : : – myq–m+2 + f Qd
d = 1yq + 2yq–1 + : : : + myq–m+1
It sets the k-th key as
K  T1

gy
q
2

–
Qb2   

gy
q–m+2
2

–
Qbm 
gxf2
Qd 
gf2
QbQd
K0gd02 , K00gd2, Ki

gd2
i
Note that the parts in Gp2 in the k-th key can be com-
puted by B using the Gp2 elements in the assumption. We
observe that if T = gxy
q+1
2 , this will be a properly dis-
tributed semi-functional key of type 1, and when T is a
random element in Gp2 , this will be a properly distributed
semi-functional key of type 2.
We can thus conclude that, if T = gxy
q+1
2 , then B has
properly simulated Gamek,1. If T is a random element
in Gp2 , then B has properly simulated Gamek,2. Hence,
B can use the output of A to distinguish between these
possibilities for T .
Lemma 5. Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 2. Then,
Gamek,2 and Gamek,3 are computationally indistin-
guishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that dis-
tinguishes Gamek,2 and Gamek,3. Then, we can build
an algorithm B with non-negligible advantage in break-
ing Assumption 2. B is given g, X1X2, Y2Y3, X3, X4, T and
will simulate Gamek,2 or Gamek,3 with A. B chooses
˛, a, b, a0, a1, : : : , an 2 ZN and Z, Z0, Z00, Z0, Z1, : : : , Zn 2
Gp4 uniformly at random. It then sets u = ga0 , h1 =
ga1 , : : : , hn = gan and sends A the public parameters
PK = (N, gZ, gaZ0, gbZ00, e(g, g)˛ , V = uZ0
{Hi = hi  Zi}1in, X4)
The first k – 1 semi-functional keys of type 3, the normal
keys should greater than k, and the challenge ciphertext are
constructed exactly as in the Lemma 2.
To answer the k-th key quest for S = (s1, : : : , sn), B pro-
ceeds as it did in the Lemma 2, but B additionally chooses
a random exponent ı 2 ZN and sets
K = g˛TaTbQt QR  (Y2Y3)ı , K0 = TQt  QR0
K00 = T  QR00, {Ki = Ta0si+ai  QR0i}1in
The only change we have made here is adding the (Y2Y3)ı
term, which randomizes the Gp2 part of K. If T
$ Gp1 
Gp2  Gp3 , this is a properly distributed semi-functional
key of type 2. If T $ Gp1  Gp3 , this is a properly
distributed semi-functional key of type 3.
We can conclude that, if T $ Gp1  Gp2  Gp3 , then
B has properly simulated Gamek,2. If T
$ Gp1  Gp3 ,
then B has properly simulated Gamek,3. Hence, B can use
the output of A to distinguish between these possibilities
for T .
Lemma 6. Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 5. Then,
GameQ,3 and GameFinal0 are computationally indistin-
guishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distin-
guishes GameQ,3 and GameFinal0 . Then, we can build
an algorithm B with non-negligible advantage in breaking
Assumption 5. B is given g, g2, g˛X2, gsY2, X3, X4, T and
will simulateGameQ,3 orGameFinal0 withA.B chooses
a, b, a0, a1, : : : , an 2 ZN and Z, Z0, Z00, Z0, Z1, : : : , Zn 2
Gp4 uniformly at random. It then sets u = ga0 , h1 =
ga1 , : : : , hn = gan and sends A the public parameters
PK = (N, gZ, gaZ0, gbZ00, e(g, g˛X2) = e(g, g)˛
V = uZ0, {Hi = hi  Zi}1in, X4)
Each time B is asked to provide a key for S = (s1, : : : , sn),
B creates a semi-functional key of type 3 by choosing
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random exponents t, Nt, Qd 2 ZN , random elements
R, R0, R00, R1, : : : , Rn 2 Gp3 , and setting
K = (g˛X2)gatgbNtR  gQd2, K0 = gNtR0, K00 = gtR00
{Ki = (usi hi)tRi}1in
We note that K can be written as g˛gatgbNtR  gd2, where
gd2 = X2g
Qd
2, so this is a properly distributed semi-functional
key of type 3.
At some point, A sends B two (equal length) messages
M0, M1 and two access structures (A, ,T0), (A, , T1),
where A is an `m matrix. B chooses ˇ 2 {0, 1} randomly
and does the following:
(1) B chooses random values Qv2, : : : , Qvm 2 ZN and cre-
ates the vector Qv = (1, Qv2, : : : , Qvm). B also chooses
two random vectors v0 = (s0, v02, : : : , v0m) and w0 =(w01, : : :, w0m)2 ZmN .(2) B chooses random values Qrj, r0j ,  0j 2 ZN and Z01,
Z001 , Z02, Z002 , QZ1,j, Z01,j, Z2,j, Z02,j 2 Gp4 for 1  j  `.
(3) Let Tˇ = (t(1), : : : , t(`)). B chooses random
exponent c0 2 ZN and computes
QC1 = Mˇ  T , C01 = (gsY2)b  Z01
C001 = gsY2  Z001
C1,j = (gsY2)aAjQv(gsY2)–(a0t(j)+a(j))Qrj QZ1,j
D1,j = (gsY2)Qrj  Z01,j
QC2 = e(g, g)˛s
0
, C02 = gbs
0
gbc
0
2  Z02
C002 = gs
0
gc
0
2  Z002
C2,j = gaAjv
0 (Vt(j) H(j))–r
0
j Z2,j
 gaAjw
0+ 0j (a0t(j)+a(j))
2
D2,j = g
r0j Z02,j  g
– 0j
2
(4) B sets the challenge ciphertext as C =
((A, ), QC1, C01, C001 , {C1,j, D1,j}1j`, QC2, C02, C002 ,{C2,j, D2,j}1j`) and sends it to A.
Let gsY2 = gsgc2, then
QC1 = Mˇ  T , C01 = gbsZ01  gbc2 , C001 = gsZ001  gc2
C1,j = gaAjv(Vt(j) H(j))–rj Z1,j  gaAjw+j(j)2
D1,j = grj Z01,j  g
–j
2
QC2 = e(g, g)˛s
0
, C02 = gbs
0
Z02  gbc
0
2 , C
00
2 = g
s0Z002  gc
0
2
C2,j = gaAjv
0 (Vt(j) H(j))–r
0
j Z2,j  g
aAjw0+ 0j (j)
2
D2,j = g
r0j Z02,j  g
– 0j
2
where v = (s, sQv2, : : : , sQvm), rj = sQrj, Z1,j = QZ1,j

Z
t(j)
0
Z(j)

rj
, w = cQv, j = –cQrj, and (j) = a0t(j) + a(j). Note
that the values of a, b, a0, a(j), t(j), Qv2, : : : , Qvm, Qrj modulo
p1 are uncorrelated from their values modulo p2.
If T = e(g, g)˛s, this is a properly distributed
semi-functional encryption of Mˇ and B simulates
GameQ,3. Otherwise, this is a properly distributed semi-
functional encryption of a random message in GT , and B
simulates GameFinal0 . Hence, B can use the output of A
to distinguish between these possibilities for T .
Lemma 7. Suppose that G satisfies Assumption 6. Then
GameFinal0 and GameFinal1 are computationally indis-
tinguishable.
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that distin-
guishes GameFinal0 and GameFinal1 . Then we can build
an algorithm B with non-negligible advantage in breaking
Assumption 6. B is given (g, g2, gaX2, gaZ0, gsY2Y4, X3,
X4, T) and will simulate GameFinal0 or GameFinal1 with
A. B chooses ˛, b, a0, a1, : : : , an 2 ZN and Z, Z00, Z0,
Z1, : : :, Zn 2 Gp4 uniformly at random. It then sets
u = ga0 , h1 = ga1 , : : : , hn = gan and sends A the public
parameters
PK = (N, gZ, gaZ0, gbZ00, e(g, g)˛
V = uZ0, {H = hi  Zi}1in, X4)
Each time B is asked to provide a key for S =
(s1, : : : , sn), B creates a semi-functional key of type 3 by
choosing random exponents t, Nt,2 ZN , random elements
R, R0, R00, R1, : : : , Rn 2 Gp3 , and setting
K = g˛(gaX2)tgbNtR, K0 = gNtR0, K00 = gtR00
{Ki = (usi hi)tRi}1in
Observe that it is a properly distributed semi-functional key
of type 3 because the values of t modulo p2 is uncorrelated
to their values modulo p1.
At some point, A sends B two (equal length) messages
M0, M1 and two access structures (A, ,T0), (A, , T1),
where A is an `m matrix. B chooses ˇ 2 {0, 1} randomly
and does the following:
(1) B chooses random vectors Qv = (1, Qv2, : : : , Qvm) and
Qv0 = (1, Qv02, : : : , Qv0m).
(2) B also chooses rj, r0j , j,  0j , (j) 2 ZN and QZ01,
QZ001 , QZ02, QZ002 , QZ1,j, Z01,j, QZ2,j, Z02,j 2 Gp4 uniformly at
random, for 1  j  `.
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Table I. Comparison of CP-ABE schemes, where ‘linear’ means that the size of ciphertext scales linearly with the complexity of the
access structure.
Scheme Anonymity of Expressiveness of Security Ciphertext size
access structures access structures
CP-ABE [6] No LSSS Fully secure Linear
IPE? [6] Fully hidden Inner-product predicates Fully secure Linear
[23,24] Partially hidden AND-gates on multi-valued Selectively secure Linear
Attributes with wildcards
[27] Partially hidden AND-gates on multi-valued Fully secure Linear
Attributes with wildcards
Ours Partially hidden LSSS Fully secure Linear
CP-ABE, ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption; IPE, inner-product predicate encryption; LSSS, linear secret-sharing scheme.
?In a CP-ABE scheme with fully hidden access structure which is derived from attribute-hiding IPE, the access structure must be converted to an
inner-product predicate, and this causes a superpolynomial blowup in ciphertext size.
(3) Let Tˇ = (t(1), : : : , t(`)). B chooses random
exponents Qs 2 ZN and sets
QC1 $ GT , C01 = (gsY2Y4)b  QZ01
C001 = gsY2Y4  QZ001
C1,j = TAjQv(Vt(j) H(j))–rj  QZ1,j  gj(j)2
D1,j = grj Z01,j  g
–j
2
QC2 = e(g, gsY2Y4)˛Qs = e(g, g)˛sQs
C02 = (gsY2Y4)bQs  QZ02, C002 = (gsY2Y4)Qs  QZ002
C2,j = TQsAjQv
0 (Vt(j) H(j))–r
0
j  QZ2,j  g
 0j (j)
2
D2,j = g
r0j Z02,j  g
– 0j
2
(4) B sets the challenge ciphertext as C = ((A, ), QC1,
C01, C001 , {C1,j, D1,j}1j`, QC2, C02, C002 , {C2,j, D2,j}1j`) and sends it to A.
If T = gasD2D4, let D2 = g

2 , we have
QC1 $ GT , C01 = gbsZ01  gbc2 , C001 = gsZ001  gc2
C1,j = gaAjv(Vt(j) H(j))–rj Z1,j  ga
0Ajw+j(j)
2
D1,j = grj Z01,j  g
–j
2
QC2 = e(g, g)˛s
0
,C02 =gbs
0
Z02 gbc
0
2 ,C
00
2 =g
s0Z002 gc
0
2
C2,j = gaAjv
0(Vt(j) H(j))–r
0
j Z2,j g
a0Ajw0+ 0j (j)
2
D2,j = g
r0j Z02,j  g
– 0j
2
where v = (s, sQv2, : : : , sQvm), Z01 = Yb4 QZ01, Z001 = Y4 QZ001 ,
gc2 = Y2, s
0
= sQs, v0 = (s0, s0 Qv02, : : : , s0 Qv0m), Z02 = YbQs4 QZ02,
Z002 = YQs4 QZ002 , gc
0
2 = Y
Qs
2, a
0w =  Qv, a0w0 =  QsQv0, Z01,j =
DAjQv4 QZ1,j, and Z2,j = D
QsAjQv0
4
QZ2,j. This is a properly dis-
tributed semi-functional encryption of a random message
in GT . If T
$ Gp1  Gp2  Gp4 , this is a properly dis-
tributed semi-functional ciphertext with QC1 random inGT ,
and C1,j, C2,j random in Gp1 Gp2 Gp4 .
We can conclude that, if T = gasD2D4, then B has prop-
erly simulatedGameFinal0 . If T
$ Gp1Gp2Gp4 , then
B has properly simulated GameFinal1 . Hence, B can use
the output of A to distinguish between these possibilities
for T .
Comparison. There exist a few efforts [23,24,27] on CP-
ABE with partially hidden access structure. However, these
schemes only support restricted access structures, which
can be expressed as AND gates on multi-valued attributes
with wildcards. Compared with these schemes, our scheme
is more flexible and expressive. An overview comparing
our CP-ABE scheme to those of other CP-ABE schemes
with hidden access structure is given in Table I. The table
shows that our scheme is superior to all the other CP-ABE
schemes with partially hidden access structure because our
scheme handles the most expressive access structures and
is fully secure in the standard model.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered a new model for CP-ABE
with partially hidden access structure and presented a
concrete construction. Our scheme is able to handle any
access structure that can be expressed as an LSSS. Previ-
ous CP-ABE schemes with partially hidden access struc-
ture [23,24,27] only support restricted access structures,
which can be expressed as AND gates on multi-valued
attributes with wildcards; thus, our scheme is more flex-
ible and expressive. We also showed that CP-ABE with
partially hidden access structure is more appropriate to use
in constructing privacy-preserving EMR systems than the
standard CP-ABE schemes used in previous work [30–33].
By applying the methodology proposed by Lewko and
Waters [1] recently, we proved that our scheme is fully
secure in the standard model. The security of our scheme
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:4897–4913 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 4911
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relies on some non-standard complexity assumptions. A
further direction is to find expressive CP-ABE construc-
tions with partially hidden access structure based on
simple assumptions.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China (nos. 61572235, 61300226),
Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Edu-
cation of China (no. 20134401120017), Guangdong Nat-
ural Science Funds for Distinguished Young Scholar (no.
2015A030306045), ISN Research Fund (no. ISN15-04),
and Pearl River S&T Nova Program of Guangzhou.
REFERENCES
1. Lewko AB, Waters B. New proof methods for
attribute-based encryption: achieving full security
through selective techniques. In CRYPTO, Santa Bar-
bara, CA, USA, 2012; 180–198.
2. Sahai A, Waters B. Fuzzy identity-based encryption.
In EUROCRYPT, Aarhus, Denmark, 2005; 457–473.
3. Goyal V, Pandey O, Sahai A, Waters B. Attribute-
based encryption for fine-grained access control of
encrypted data. In ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, Alexandria, VA, USA,
2006; 89–98.
4. Bethencourt J, Sahai A, Waters B. Ciphertext-policy
attribute-based encryption. In IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, USA,
2007; 321–334.
5. Cheung L, Newport CC. Provably secure cipher-
text policy ABE. ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, Alexandria, Virginia, USA,
2007; 456–465.
6. Lewko AB, Okamoto T, Sahai A, Takashima K, Waters
B. Fully secure functional encryption: attribute-based
encryption and (hierarchical) inner-product encryp-
tion. In EUROCRYPT, French Riviera, 2010; 62–91.
7. Waters B. Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryp-
tion: an expressive, efficient, and provably secure real-
ization. In Public Key Cryptography, Taormina, Italy,
2011; 53–70.
8. Katz J, Sahai A, Waters B. Predicate encryption sup-
porting disjunctions, polynomial equations, and inner
products. In EUROCRYPT, Istanbul, Turkey, 2008;
146–162.
9. Lai J, Deng RH, Li Y. Expressive cp-abe with partially
hidden access structures. In ASIACCS, Seoul, Korea,
2012.
10. Waters B. Dual system encryption: realizing fully
secure IBE and HIBE under simple assumptions.
CRYPTO, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 2009; 619–636.
11. Goyal V, 0002 AJ, Pandey O, Sahai A. Bounded
ciphertext policy attribute based encryption. In ICALP
(2), Reykjavik, Iceland, 2008; 579–591.
12. Ostrovsky R, Sahai A, Waters B. Attribute-based
encryption with non-monotonic access structures. In
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Alexandria, Virginia, USA, 2007; 195–203.
13. Chase M. Multi-authority attribute based encryption.
In TCC, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2007; 515–534.
14. Lin H, Cao Z, Liang X, Shao J. Secure threshold multi
authority attribute based encryption without a central
authority. In INDOCRYPT, Kharagpur, India, 2008;
426–436.
15. Chase M, Chow S S M. Improving privacy and secu-
rity in multi-authority attribute-based encryption. In
Acm Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Chicago, Illinois, USA, 2009; 121–130.
16. Lewko AB, Waters B. Unbounded HIBE and attribute-
based encryption. In EUROCRYPT, Tallinn, Estonia,
2011; 547–567.
17. Shi E, Waters B. Delegating capabilities in predicate
encryption systems. In ICALP (2), Reykjavik, Iceland,
2008; 560–578.
18. Okamoto T, Takashima K. Hierarchical predicate
encryption for inner-products. In ASIACRYPT, Tokyo,
Japan, 2009; 214–231.
19. Shen E, Shi E, Waters B. Predicate privacy in encryp-
tion systems. In TCC, San Francisco, CA, USA, 2009;
457–473.
20. Okamoto T, Takashima K. Fully secure functional
encryption with general relations from the decisional
linear assumption. In CRYPTO, Santa Barbara, CA,
USA, 2010; 191–208.
21. Müller S, Katzenbeisser S, Eckert C. Distributed
attribute-based encryption. In ICISC, Seoul, Korea,
2008; 20–36.
22. Lewko AB, Waters B. Decentralizing attribute-based
encryption. In EUROCRYPT, Tallinn, Estonia, 2011;
568–588.
23. Nishide T, Yoneyama K, Ohta K. Attribute-based
encryption with partially hidden encryptor-specified
access structures. In ACNS, New York, NY, USA,
2008; 111–129.
24. Li J, Ren K, Zhu B, Wan Z. Privacy-aware attribute-
based encryption with user accountability. ISC, Pisa,
Italy, 2009; 347–362.
25. Canetti R, Halevi S, Katz J. A forward-
secure public-key encryption scheme.
EUROCRYPT, Warsaw, Poland, 2003;
255–271.
26. Boneh D, Boyen X. Efficient selective-ID secure
identity-based encryption without random oracles.
4912 Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:4897–4913 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/sec
L. Liu et al.
In EUROCRYPT, Interlaken, Switzerland, 2004;
223–238.
27. Lai J, Deng RH, Li Y. Fully secure cipertext-policy
hiding CP-ABE. In ISPEC, Guangzhou, China, 2011;
24–39.
28. Lewko AB, Waters B. New techniques for dual system
encryption and fully secure HIBE with short cipher-
texts. In TCC, Zurich, Switzerland, 2010; 455–479.
29. Lewko AB, Rouselakis Y, Waters B. Achieving leak-
age resilience through dual system encryption. In TCC,
Providence, RI, USA, 2011; 70–88.
30. Narayan S, Gagné M, Safavi-Naini R. Privacy preserv-
ing ehr system using attribute-based infrastructure. In
CCSW, Chicago, IL, USA, 2010; 47–52.
31. Kamara S, Lauter K. Cryptographic cloud storage. In
Financial Cryptography Workshops, Tenerife, Canary
Islands, Spain, 2010; 136–149.
32. Li M, Yu S, Ren K, Lou W. Securing personal
health records in cloud computing: patient-centric and
fine-grained data access control in multi-owner set-
tings. Securecomm, Singapore, 2010; 89–106.
33. Akinyele JA, Lehmann CU, Green M, Pagano MW,
Peterson ZNJ, Rubin AD. Self-protecting electronic
medical records using attribute-based encryption.
IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2010; 2010: 565.
34. Beimel A. Secure schemes for secret sharing and
key distribution. PhD Thesis, Israel Institute of
Technology, 1996.
35. Boneh D, Goh EJ, Nissim K. Evaluating 2-dnf for-
mulas on ciphertexts. In TCC, Cambridge, MA, USA,
2005; 325–341.
36. Bellare M, Waters B, Yilek S. Identity-based encryp-
tion secure against selective opening attack. In TCC,
Providence, RI, USA, 2011; 235–252.
Security Comm. Networks 2016; 9:4897–4913 © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 4913
DOI: 10.1002/sec
